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ANOTHER LOOK

AT THE

L’AMBIANCE PLAZA COLLAPSE

By Rachel Martin1 and Norbert J. Delatte,2 Member, ASCE
ABSTRACT: The collapse of the L’Ambiance Plaza building, under construction in Bridgeport, Conn., in 1987,
killed 28 construction workers. A number of concurrent investigations were undertaken to attempt to determine
the cause. At least six separate theories were developed. However, a prompt legal settlement kept these investigations from being completed. This paper reviews the collapse and discusses the competing theories. The
failure focused controversy on the safety of the lift-slab construction method. Because there is a need in civil
engineering education for case studies to illustrate ethical and professional issues as well as technical principles,
this paper also addresses these aspects. Ways for civil engineering educators to use this case study to address
these issues also are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
The death of 28 workers in the construction collapse of the
L’Ambiance Plaza building in Bridgeport, Conn., triggered a
massive rescue effort and several investigations. Both the legal
and engineering professions are interested in causes of failures.
The legal profession seeks to assign responsibility, and the
engineering profession seeks to learn from failures in order to
eliminate poor designs and unsafe practices. Sometimes, as in
the case of the investigation of the L’Ambiance Plaza collapse,
the two objectives are in conﬂict.
For the engineer and engineering student, knowledge of engineering failures is just as important as knowledge of its successes. A success illustrates what engineering can make possible, whereas a failure demonstrates its limits. It takes
numerous successful structures to ensure the quality of a design or a construction method. One failure, however, can discredit an entire design or building technique. Because of this,
the information that each failure has to offer should be carefully studied and applied to all future designs. As a result similar failures, as well as their tragic consequences, can be
avoided.
Because of their importance, failures should be incorporated
into engineering education. Unfortunately, undergraduate engineering students receive little exposure to engineering failures in college. This approach to engineering education not
only leaves students less prepared for what they will face after
graduation, but it also fails to show the importance of continuing education (Delatte 1997). This may be one of the reasons
that a 1983 survey of ASCE section and branch presidents
found that engineering failures are all too common (Bosela
1993).
Because undergraduate engineering students already face an
overcrowded curriculum, rather than requiring a new class
covering failure case studies, these case studies can be incorporated into existing classes throughout a student’s college career. Not only will this approach capture the students’ interest
by showing how their classes relate to engineering, but it also
will inspire them to learn more about the history of the profession. In addition, it teaches them the importance of continued learning throughout one’s professional career. Finally, failure case studies provide a perfect opportunity to discuss ethical
concerns in real life situations as well as serve as a reminder

of the repercussions of careless engineering (Delatte 1997).
This is a topic that is often neglected in engineering education.
According to a 1987 survey conducted by the Committee
of Education of the Committee on Forensic Engineering of
ASCE, 63.2% of schools indicated that they would consider
teaching a course on failure case studies if the appropriate
materials were available. This clearly demonstrates the need
for case study material and teaching aids to encourage the
incorporation of failure case studies into the engineering curriculum (Rendon-Herrero 1993). The objectives of this paper
are to
• Summarize what is known about the design, construction,
and collapse of L’Ambiance Plaza
• Examine the causes of the failure as well as the legal
ramiﬁcations
• Explore the technical, procedural, and ethical concerns
present, focusing on how the failure could have been
avoided and how to prevent similar failures in the future
This failure case study can be integrated into engineering
classes to introduce new topics or as the topic of a short research paper.
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
L’Ambiance Plaza was planned to be a 16-story building
with 13 apartment levels topping three parking levels. It consisted of two offset rectangular towers, 19.2 X 34.1 m (63 X
112 ft) each, connected by an elevator (Fig. 1). Posttensioned
concrete slabs 178-mm (7-in.) thick and steel columns comprised its structural frame (Cuoco et al. 1992). Posttensioning
overcomes the tensile weakness of concrete slabs by placing
high strength steel wires along their length or width before the
concrete is poured. After the concrete hardens, hydraulic jacks
pull and anchor the wires compressing the concrete (Levy and
Salvadori 1992).
The lift-slab method of construction, patented by Youtz and
Slick in 1948, was utilized in the construction of this building.
Following this technique, the ﬂoors slabs for all 16 levels were
constructed on the ground, one on top of the other, with bond
breakers between them. Then packages of two or three slabs
were lifted into temporary position by a hydraulic lifting apparatus and held in place by steel wedges. The lifting apparatus consisted of a hydraulic jack on top of each column, with
a pair of lifting rods extending down to lifting collars cast in
the slab.
Once the slabs were positioned correctly, they were permanently attached to the steel columns. Two shear walls in
each tower were to provide the lateral resistance for the completed building on all but the top two ﬂoors. These two ﬂoors
depended on the rigid joints between the steel columns and
the concrete slabs for their stability. Because the shear wall
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Floor Plan of L’Ambiance Plaza

Ruins of L’Ambiance Plaza (Image from Internet at (http://www.sgh.com/aplaza.htm))

played such an indispensable role in the lateral stability of the
building, the structural drawings speciﬁed that during construction the shear walls should be within three ﬂoors of the
lifted slabs (Heger 1991).
COLLAPSE
At the time of collapse, the building was a little more than
halfway completed (Fig. 2). In the west tower, the 9th, 10th,
and 11th ﬂoor slab package was parked in Stage IV directly
under the 12th ﬂoor and roof package (Fig. 3). The shear walls
were about ﬁve levels below the lifted slabs (Cuoco et al.
1992).
The workmen were tack welding wedges under the 9th,
10th, and 11th ﬂoor package to temporarily hold them into
position when a loud metallic sound followed by rumbling was
heard. Kenneth Shepard, an ironworker who was installing
wedges at the time, looked up to see the slab over him ‘‘cracking like ice breaking.’’ Suddenly, the slab fell onto the slab
below it, which was unable to support this added weight and
in turn fell. The entire structure collapsed, ﬁrst the west tower
and then the east tower, in 5 s, only 2.5 s longer than it would

FIG. 3. Status of Construction at Time of Collapse [Based on
Information from Cuoco (1992)]

have taken an object to free fall from that height. Ten days of
frantic rescue operations revealed that 28 construction workers
died in the collapse, making it the worst lift-slab construction
accident. Kenneth Shepard was the only one on his crew to
survive (Levy and Salvadori 1992).

CAUSES OF FAILURE
An unusually prompt legal settlement prematurely ended all
investigations of the collapse. Consequently, the exact cause
of the collapse has never been established. The building had
a number of deﬁciencies—
any one of which could have triggered the collapse. The question, however, remains which one
of these problems was in fact the triggering mechanism leading to the total collapse. There are six competing theories as
to the trigger. Kaminetzky lists, but does not discuss, a seventh
theory—
‘‘failure resulting from lateral soil pressure acting on
the foundation walls’’ (Kaminetzky 1991, p. 82).
• Theory 1: National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Md.—
An overloaded steel angle welded to a shearhead arm channel deformed, causing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip out and the collapse to begin (Korman
1987).
• Theory 2: Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers—
The instability of the wedges holding the 12th ﬂoor and roof package
caused the collapse (Cuoco et al. 1992).
• Theory 3: Schupack Suarez Engineers, Inc.—
The improper design of the posttensioning tendons caused the
collapse (Poston et al. 1991).
• Theory 4: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), Washington, D.C.—
Questionable weld details
and substandard welds caused the collapse (McGuire
1992).
• Theory 5: Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. (FaAA)—
The sensitivity of L’Ambiance Plaza to lateral displacement caused its collapse through global instability (Moncarz et al. 1993).
• Theory 6: Oswald Rendon-Herrero—
Rapid slump of a
column footing precipitated the collapse (Rendon-Herrero
1994).
Theory 1—
Overloaded Steel Angle
The NBS investigation concluded that the failure occurred
at the building’s most heavily loaded column, E4.8, or the
adjacent column, E3.8, as a result of a lifting assembly failure
(Fig. 4). The shearhead reinforces the concrete slab at each
column, transfers vertical loads from the slabs to the columns,
and provides a place of attachment for the lifting assembly. It
consists of steel channels cast in the concrete slab, leaving a
space for the lifting angle. The lifting angle has holes to pass
the lifting rods through. These rods are raised by the hydraulic
jacks on the columns above them (Levy and Salvadori 1992).
Shortly before the collapse, the workers lifted the 9th, 10th,
and 11th ﬂoor package to its ﬁnal position and began tack
welding the steel wedges into place. They used a jack on top
of the column, E4.8 or E3.8, to slightly adjust the position of
the slab overloading the lifting angles. When the shearheads
and lifting angles had lifted the package of three 3.13-MN
(320-ton) slabs, they were dangerously close to their maximum
capacity, so adding even the smallest of loads could strain
them.
One of the reasons was that the lifting capacities of the two
types of jacks used were too small for the 9.38-MN (960-ton)
package being lifted. The regular jacks have a maximum load
of 869 kN (89 tons), and the superjacks have a maximum load
of 1.47 MN (150 tons). The NBS also tested the shearhead
and lifting angle and found that they tended to twist as the
loads approached 781 kN (80 tons) because, although strong
enough, they were not stiff enough. The excess force deformed
the lifting angle, allowing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip
out of the lifting angle and hit the column with 333 kN (75,000
lb) of force. This accounts for the loud noise that Kenneth

FIG. 4.

Lifting Assembly

Shepard heard and the indentation found in that column. After
this initial slip, the jack rods and lifting nuts in the entire E
line progressively slipped, causing the ninth ﬂoor slab to collapse, which initiated the collapse of the entire building (Korman 1987). This theory was later abandoned by NBS in favor
of Theory 4 (Culver and Marshall 1994).
Theory 2—
Unstable Wedges
Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers concluded that the instability
of the wedges at Column 3E caused the 12th ﬂoor and roof
package to fall, which initiated the collapse. They disagreed
with the NBS investigation, ﬁnding that all the wedges supporting the 9th, 10th, and 11th ﬂoor package were mounted
prior to the collapse and that the column had no indentations
on it. They, however, did ﬁnd abnormal tack welds on the
wedges that supported the 12th ﬂoor and roof package, a large
deformation on the top edge of the west wedge of this set, and
indentations on the underside of the Level 9 shearhead. The
shallowness of the indentations indicated that, although both
lifting nuts slipped out, they were not heavily loaded at the
time.
Their investigation also found that the shearhead gaps on
Columns 3E and 3.8E [16 mm (0.628 in.)] were much larger
than the gaps on the rest of the building [5.92–8.31 mm
(0.233–0.327 in.)] and other buildings built with the lift-slab
technique [6.35–9.53 mm (0.250–0.375 in.)]. In addition to
these abnormally large gaps, the shearheads used on these two
columns did not have cutouts in their lifting angles to restrict
relative shifting and were installed eccentrically. Finally, until
a wedge is completely welded into place, it depends on friction
to hold it. Normally, this is sufﬁcient. The large shearhead gaps
on Columns 3E and 3.8E and the presence of hydraulic fuel
on these wedges, however, would have demanded an extremely high friction coefﬁcient to hold the wedges in place.
On the day of collapse, the lateral load from the hydraulic
jack exerted on the heavily loaded wedges caused the west
wedge to roll. Then the local adjustments to slab elevations
caused the remaining wedge to roll out, which initiated the
collapse of the 11th ﬂoor and roof package and the west tower
(Fig. 5). Forces transmitted through the pour strips or the horizontal jack, or the impact of the debris from the west tower
triggered the east tower’s collapse (Cuoco et al. 1992).
Theory 3—
Improper Design of Posttensioning
Tendons
Schupack Suarez Engineers, Inc. analyzed the structural behavior of a typical west tower ﬂoor slab, with respect to the
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Failure Sequence

General Layout of Posttensioning Tendons (Each Line Represents 1–5 Monostrand Tendons)

unusual layout of the posttensioning tendons (Fig. 6). The tendons in the east tower follow a typical two-way banded posttensioning tendon layout. In this layout the vertical tendons
distribute the weight of the slab to the east-west column lines,
which in turn distribute the weight to the columns. The west
tower, however, deviates from this pattern. At Column 4.8E
the tendons split in two, both diverging from the column line.
In the west tower, the vertical tendons still distribute the slab’s
weight to the column line. In Line E, however, there are no
tendons to carry this weight. This setup violates the building
code of the American Concrete Institute, Detroit. Kaminetzky
pointed out that the code stipulates ‘‘a minimum of two tendons shall be provided in each direction through the critical
shear section over columns’’ (Kaminetzky 1991, p. 84).
Furthermore, the design details of the posttensioned ﬂoor
slabs do not show the location of the shear walls or the openings for the walls at Columns 11A, 8A, and 2H. The design
did not take these openings into account. Detailed ﬁnite-element analysis showed that tensile stresses along Column Line
E, east of Column 4.8E, exceeded the cracking strength of the
concrete. Therefore once a crack began, it would immediately
spread to Column 4.8E. In addition, under ideal lifting conditions, the analysis demonstrated that column 2H would have
unsuitably high compressive and punching shear stresses (Poston et al. 1991).
Theory 4—
Poor Weld Details and Welds
OSHA found that the header bar-to-channel welds on one
side of the ninth-ﬂoor shearhead, at Column E3.8, had failed
(Fig. 7). The use of one-sided square-groove welds for the
header bar-to-channel connection was criticized because they
were not prequaliﬁed joints, according to the American Welding Society. Because their penetration was not known, their
strength could not be determined. OSHA hired Neal S. More-

FIG. 7.

Wedged Slab-to-Column Connection

ton and Associates to examine 30 welds around the shearheads
at Column E3.8 at the 7th, 8th, and 10th ﬂoors. They found
only 13 of the 30 welds acceptable; the other 17 were substandard. The questionable weld details and substandard welding, coupled with drawings that indicated that the welds would
undoubtedly experience forces that they could not resist, all
point to weld failure as the trigger of the collapse (McGuire
1992).
Theory 5—
Global Instability
FaAA studied the tower’s torsional stability and response to
lateral loading to understand its collapse. When the concrete
slabs are temporarily resting on the wedges, the connection is
rotationally stiff but, as soon as the slab is lifted off one of
the wedges into its ﬁnal position, it can rotate freely from the
column. Once the wedges are fully welded into their ﬁnal po-

sitions, the connection becomes rigid again. In the absence of
lateral loading, the tower is completely stable.
Lateral loading and displacement, however, can cause the
slab to lift off one of its wedges, causing the structure to become laterally ﬂexible. FaAA used 3D computer modeling
(ANSYS) and nonlinear stability modeling to study this phenomenon. Their investigation and analysis led them to the conclusion that the tower’s sensitivity to lateral displacement
caused its collapse. Although FaAA analysts acknowledge that
another mechanism could have triggered the lateral displacement, they believe that lateral jacking provided sufﬁcient displacement to initiate the collapse (Moncarz et al. 1993).
Theory 6—
Foundation Failure
In a discussion to Cuoco et al.’s 1992 paper, Rendon-Herrero suggested that ‘‘a closer look warrants reconsideration of
the role played by the foundation in the collapse’’ (RendonHerrero 1994). He noted the the NBS report found disintegrated rock and bedrock and ﬁll materials of varying quality.
The report also questioned whether testing of in-place density
had been performed and the rationale for the assumption of
the allowable bearing pressure. He concluded that ‘‘the writer
feels that descriptions like ‘mica,’ ‘micaceous schist,’ ‘highly
fractured,’ ‘cracks,’ ‘disintegrated rock,’ ‘ﬁll,’ ‘compaction
with backhoe,’ ‘highly weathered,’ ‘thinly laminated,’ and
‘very steep dip (nearly vertical)’ are red ﬂags that indicate the
need for caution and special attention in the design of a foundation. Punching or local shear is likely when subgrade conditions include loose granular soils (i.e., inadequate compaction); micaceous soils; micaceous schists; and highly fractured,
steeply dipping bedrock’’ (Rendon-Herrero 1994).
LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS
All of these theories are plausible, but what triggered the
collapse? That may never be known. A two-judge panel mediated a universal settlement between 100 parties, which
closed the L’Ambiance Plaza case. Twenty or more separate
parties were found guilty of ‘‘widespread negligence, carelessness, sloppy practices, and complacency.’’ They all contributed, in varying amounts, to the $41,000,000 settlement
fund. Those injured and the families of those killed in the
collapse received $30,000,000. Another $7,600,000 was set
aside to pay for all of the claims and counterclaims between
the designers and contractors of L’Ambiance Plaza.
Although this settlement kept hundreds of cases out of court
and provided rapid closure to a colossal collapse, it also ended
all investigations prematurely, leaving the cause of the collapse
undetermined (Korman 1988). Fortunately, many of the investigators subsequently published their ﬁndings (Feld and Carper
1997).
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
Although buildings constructed by the lift-slab method are
stable once they are completed, if great care is not taken during
construction, they can be dangerous. Feld and Carper (1997)
reviewed a number of previous lift-slab construction failures
and near failures. The following measures can be taken to
ensure lateral stability and safety during construction:
• During all stages of construction, temporary lateral bracing should be provided, unless the lateral stability of the
structure is provided through another mechanism.
• Concrete punching shear and connection redundancies
should be provided in the structure (Kaminetzky 1991).
• Sway bracing (cables that keep the stack of ﬂoors from
shifting sideways) should be used. This was required, but
not used in L’Ambiance Plaza (Levy and Salvadori 1992).

Due to the terms of the settlement, many of the technical lessons that could have been learned from this incident were lost.
PROFESSIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The L’Ambiance Plaza collapse highlighted several procedural deﬁciencies. Responsibility for design was fragmented
among so many subcontractors that several design deﬁciencies
went undetected. If the engineer of record had taken responsibility for the overall design of the building or a second engineer had reviewed the design plans, these defects probably
would have been detected (Heger 1991). Also, standardized
step-by-step procedures for lift-slab construction should be established to ensure the safety of the construction workers. A
licensed professional engineer should be present during construction to ensure that these guidelines are followed (Kaminetzky 1991).
ETHICAL ASPECTS
Although the L’Ambiance Plaza building was designed to
be safe once it was completed, during construction it did not
have an adequate level of stability. This is all too common in
the construction industry today (Heger 1991). Canon 1 of the
ASCE Code of Ethics states, ‘‘Engineers shall hold paramount
the safety, health and welfare of the public and shall strive to
comply with the principles of sustainable development in the
performance of their professional duties’’ (ASCE 1998). This
includes the safety of construction workers. Building regulations do not sufﬁciently consider structural safety during construction and should be changed to require a high standard of
safety during construction as well as after a building’s completion. In the absence of such regulations, however, an ethical
engineer must always consider the safety of workers (Heger
1991).
EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS
Failure plays an important role in engineering practice.
Through failure analysis, engineers can learn to avoid similar
technical errors, which allows them to build stronger, safer
structures. Because failure analysis plays such an integral role
in a good engineer’s professional career, it only makes sense
that, in college, engineering students should be taught how to
analyze engineering failures as well as their importance to any
engineer’s professional life. In light of an already overcrowded
undergraduate engineering curriculum, integrating failure case
studies into already existing engineering classes is the most
logical solution.
This approach gives students a better idea of the obstacles
that will face them after graduation, in addition to demonstrating how the theoretical ideas taught in their classes are actually
applied by engineers. The only real obstacle that lies in the
way of increased failure awareness at an undergraduate level
is the absence of adequate resources, such as well-developed
failure case studies and appropriate illustrations. This paper
provides professors and students with a failure case study that
can be integrated into undergraduate classes.
How can educators use these case studies? In structural
analysis courses, they can be used to address technical topics
such as safety during construction, load paths, and integrity of
connections. Students may be assigned to research the literature in greater depth and support or criticize the available theories. For engineering students, the legal ramiﬁcations of the
case may be of even greater interest. Two additional important
points that may be made are the importance of ﬁxing overall
responsibility on a project before difﬁculties are encountered
and the need to read the literature of the profession to keep
up with technical and procedural advances. The ambiguity of

the outcome of this case can be used to advantage when teaching students in upper division courses, by emphasizing how
much they still have to learn about the technical challenges of
the profession.
CONCLUSIONS
The L’Ambiance Plaza collapse killed 28 workers and had
serious ramiﬁcations for all involved with the project as well
as for the civil engineering profession as a whole. All of the
theories discussed above are plausible, but it seems unlikely
that the triggering mechanism of the collapse can ever be determined. There remain, nevertheless, valuable technical, professional, procedural, and ethical lessons from this case for
engineering students and practitioners.
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